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Business, 2014). Alexander F. L. Sand is a
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He has advised clients in regulatory compliance matters arising under the Dodd-Frank
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promulgated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission and National Futures
Association.
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CUTTING BACK:
REVISIONS TO DODDFRANK DERIVATIVES
RULES

From the onset of the Financial Crisis until
recently the prevailing winds have blown
mostly in one direction: toward greater regulation of the off-exchange derivatives market.
Emblematic of this trend is the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act ("Dodd-Frank"), passed in 2010, which
President Obama described as "reform [that]
will . . . rein in the abuse and excess that
nearly brought down our financial system.
[Dodd-Frank] will finally bring transparency
to the kinds of complex and risky transactions
that helped trigger the financial crisis." 1

Gensler provided a vocal pro-regulatory cultural vision. For example, a few months prior
to passage of Dodd-Frank, he argued:
In the last three decades, the over-the-counter
derivatives marketplace has grown up. It is
certainly no longer in its embryonic stage, but
it remains unregulated. From total notional
amounts of less than $1 trillion in the 1980s,
the notional value of this market has ballooned
to more than $300 trillion in the United States
- that's more than 20 times the size of the
American economy; the contracts have become much more standardized; and rapid advances in technology - particularly in the last
ten years - facilitate more efficient trading.
While so much of this marketplace has
changed significantly, the constant has been
that it is still dealer-dominated.
When a corporation or another end-user wants
to hedge a risk, they go to their bank and get a
price quote. When they enter into transactions,
those transactions largely stay on the books
with their banks. The price is not discovered
on transparent trading venues, such as exchanges, and the risk is not transferred from
the dealer's books to a central clearinghouse.
This leaves significant risk in the system, risk
that a year ago was borne by the taxpayers in
the form of the largest financial bailout in
history.
Much like the debate after the last great crisis
in the 1930s about potential regulation for both
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The Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"), under the direction of Gary
Gensler, did much to carry out this mandate.
As of December 31, 2014, the CFTC had finalized 50 rules required to be promulgated under
Dodd-Frank, more than any other single
regulator. 2 In addition to promulgating rules
mandated by Dodd-Frank, the CFTC under
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the futures. and the securities markets, we are
now debating whether the over-the-counter
derivatives market should be regulated. While
the recent crisis seems to have eased and many
banks are repaying TARP money, I believe
that we still must enact regulatory reform to
promote transparency and reduce risk in the
evolving
over-the-counter
derivatives
markets. 3

Recently, however, these pro-regulatory winds
have shifted and several notable provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act have been significantly scaled back,
including provisions that were centerpieces of the
original Act. In the futures and derivatives context,
the most significant of these changes are the effective
repeal of section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the
"Swap Push-Out Rule") and alteration of the margin
requirements for swap dealers and major swap
participants. Additionally, deadlines for complying
with portions of section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act
(the "Volcker Rule" 4 ) and for non-US swap dealers to
comply with transaction-level swap requirements
were significantly extended. Whether these rollbacks
represent a targeted tailoring of the Dodd-Frank
regulatory framework or signify a broader change in
regulatory climate is yet to be seen.
This article will survey the affected rules and how
they have changed. Section II of this article will focus
on the Swap Push-Out Rule, Section III will discuss
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the commercial end-user exemption to the margin
requirements for uncleared swaps, Section IV will
discuss postponements to the implementation of the
Volcker Rule, Section V will discuss the expanded
relief with respect to covered funds transactions for
parties using the "solely outside the United States"
exemption to the Volcker Rule, and Section VI will
discuss relief with respect to CFTC transaction-level
swap requirements.

II. Swap Push-Out Rule
Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act (known as the
"Swap Push-Out Rule"), as originally passed, prohibited entities engaged in many swaps activities from
receiving federal assistance, effectively requiring
swap trading operations to be pushed out from bank
entities into non-bank affiliates. Specifically, banks
significantly engaged in swaps activity would be unable to offer Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") insurance5 to their depositors or to access
the Federal Reserve Discount Window. 6 Significant
exceptions were provided for insured depository
institutions engaged in interest rate and foreign exchange swaps, credit default swaps referencing an asset national banks were permitted to invest in, and any
other swap entered into as a hedge against risk 7 Nonethe less, the law had the effect of requiring non-bank
affiliates of banks to engage in many swaps transactions in which the bank would otherwise engage.
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Risk Mitigation Act's provisions exempting commercial end-users from margin requirements apply
equally to captive finance companies and, so long as
the CFTC continues to exclude small banks from the
definition of a "financial entity," small banks. Note
that the Commodity Exchange Act-requires the CFTC
to "consider" excluding small banks from the definition of a "financial entity." Commodity Exchange Act
§ 2(h)(7)(C)(ii).
40 Letter from The Coalition. for Derivatives EndUsers, Re: End-User Support for End-User Provisions
in the Promoting Job Creation and Reducing Small
Business Burdens Act (H.R. 37), January 6, 2015,
available at http://www.nam.org/Issues/Coroorate-Fin
ance-Management/Coalition-for- Derivatives-End-Us
ers-Supports-CTU-Fix-in-Rep-Fitzpatrick-Bill.pdf.
41 Remarks by the President on Financial Reform.
42 Hearing Before the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, Prohibiting Certain High
Risk Investment Activities by Banks and Bank Holding Companies: Statement of Paul Volcker, S. Hrg.
11-771, Feb. 2, 2010. Thefederal agencies tasked with
promulgating regulations implementing the Volcker
Rule were the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the CFTC.
43 See Federal Reserve Board, Order Approving
Extension of Conformance Period Under Section 13
of the Bank Holding Company Act, Dec. I8, 2014,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevent
s/press!bcreglbcreg20 I41218al.pdf.
44 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary
Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships
with, Hedge Fund and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed.
Reg. 5536; 79 Fed. Reg. 5808; Federal Reserve Board,
Order Approving Extension of Conformance Period.
45 See Statement Regarding the Treatment of Collateralized Loan Obligations Under Section 13 of the
Bank Holding Company Act, April 7, 20I4, available
at http://www. federalreserve.gov /newsevents/presslb
creglbcreg20 I40407 a I. pdf.
46 0rder Approving Extension of Conformance Period at 4.
47 See

12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(d)(I)(H) & (I); 12 C.F.R.
§ 248.13(b ).
4612 C.F.R. § 248.13(b)(I).
49I2 C.F.R. § 248.13(b)(l)(iii).
5°Federal Reserve Board, Volcker Rule Frequently
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Asked Questions, Feb. 27, 2015, available at http://w
ww.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/volcker-rule/fag.
htm#13.
51 A "swap dealer" is defined as any person who:
(1) holds itself out as a dealer in swaps, (2) makes a
market in swaps, (3) regularly enters into swaps with
counterparties as an ordinary course of business for its
own account, or (4) engaged in any activity causing
the person to be known in the trade as a dealer or market maker in swaps. Commodity Exchange Act
§ la(49). However, entities engaging in de minimis
swap dealing activity are excepted from the definition.
Commodity Exchange Act§ Ia(49)(D).
52 CFTC, Factsheet: Interpretive Guidance and
Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, available at http://www.cftc.gov/u
crn/groups/public/@newsroorn/documents/file/crossb
order factsheeL-final.pdf. Entity-level requirements
relate to: (I) capital adequacy, (2) chief compliance
officer, (3) risk management, (4) swap data recordkeeping, (5) swap data reporting, and (6) large trader
reporting requirements. !d.
53 CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69, Applicability
of Transaction-Level Requirements to Activity in the
United States, at p. 2, Nov. 14, 2013, available at htt
p://www.cftc.gov/ucrn/groups/public/lrlettergeneralld
ocuments/letter/13-69 .pdf.
54CFTC No-Action Letter 14-140, Extension of
No-Action Relief: Transaction-Level Requirements
for Non-US. Swap Dealers, Nov. 14, 2014, available
at http://www .cftc.gov/ucrn/ groups/public/lrlettergen
eral/documents/letter/14-140.pdf.
55Jd.
56Jd.

THE FLASH CRASH CASE
AGAINST SARAO-WILL THE
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Introduction

••

On May 6, 2010, the so-called Flash Crash Day,
the prices of e-mini S&P 500 futures contracts, the
S&P 500 SPDR and other equity products dramatically dropped in value, followed by an almost immediate recovery. Some $600 billion in market value
disappeared briefly, and the Dow Jones Industrial
Average plunged nearly 1000 points within a few
minutes before its recovery. 1 We will refer to the May
6, 2010 market freefall simply as the "Flash Clash"

f
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although several other names have been used for that
event.
A joint-study of the Flash Crash by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) resulted in a
report that largely blamed the event on a faulty order
entered by Waddell & Reed, a large mutual fund
complex. The Joint CFTC/SEC Report stated that:
"May 6 started as an unusually turbulent day for the
markets ..... Around 1:OOpm, broadly negative market sentiments was already affecting an increase in the
price volatility of some individual securities. . . ... By
2:30pm, the S&P 500 volatility index was up 22.5
percent from the opening level, yields often-year Treasuries fell as investors engaged in a 'flight to quality,'
and selling pressure had pushed the Dow Jones Industrial Average ("DJIA") down about 2.5% .... At
2:32pm, against this backdrop of unusually high volatility and thinning liquidity, a large fundamental trader
(a mutual fund complex) initiated a sell program to sell
a total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts (valued at approximately $4,1 billion) as a hedge to an existing
equity position,. . . This large fundamental trader
chose to execute this sell program via an automated execution algorithm ("Sell Algorithm") that was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-Mini market to target an execution rate set to 9% of the trading
volume calculated over the previous minute, but without regard to price or time. . . . However, on May 6,
when markets were already under stress, the Sell
Algorithm chosen by the large trader to only target
trading volume, and neither price nor time, executed
the sell program extremely rapidly in just 20
minutes .....2

The CME Group conducted its own study of the
Flash Crash and issued a statement that objected to
the blame placed on Waddell & Reed by the Joint
CFTC/SEC Report. 3 The CME noted that Waddell &
Reed's orders were only a small part of the volume of
related trades and that traders paid little attention to
those orders.
Nanex, a market data provider, also analyzed data
from the Flash Crash and suggested that highfrequency traders (HFTs) might have been trying to

13
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outsmart each other's computers with massive
amounts of orders that were not intended to be filled.
It further suggested that HFTs might also have been
trying to paralyze the exchanges with massive orders
in order to obtain an advantage over other traders. 4
Another analysis of the trading data by a group of
economists concluded that HFTs did not trigger the
crash but that their responses to the abnormally large
sell orders may have worsened the situation. 5
The Congressional Research Service also examined
the Flash Crash and other high frequency trader
concerns. Its report noted this differences in opinions
on the reason for the Flash Crash, but did not seek to
resolve those differences. 6 The CFTC seemingly stuck
to its guns on what caused the Flash Crash for over
four years. Therefore, it came somewhat of a surprise
when the CFTC announced on April 21, 2015 that it
had filed a lawsuit against a London trader and his firm
in which it blamed those defendants as having materially contributed to the Flash Crash through "spoofing"
orders that the trader entered from his parents' modest
home in a London suburb. 7
This article will examine, among other things, (1)
the allegations set forth in the CFTC Complaint; (2)
the theories of liability covering both the pre-DoddFrank Act8 period and the post Dodd-Frank Act period; (3) how these differing theories of liability
compare to other CFTC cases; and (4) whether the
CFTC will prevail in this case against the defendants.

Allegations in the CFTC Complaint
The CFTC's Complaint against the London trader
and his firm (Navinder Singh Sarao and Nav Sarao
Futures Limited (collectively, the "Defendants" or
"Sarao")) charges those Defendants with unlawfully
manipulating, attempting to manipulate and "spoofing," all with respect to the e-mini S&P futures
contract.9 Judge Wood of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois issued an Order Granting the CFTC's Ex Parte Motion for Statutory Re-

14
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straining Order and Other Relief on April 21, 2015. 10
Also, on April 21, 2015, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed a Criminal Complaint against Sarao. 11
The CFTC Complaint had been kept under seal
since April 17, 2015 and was released on April 21,
2015, when Sarao, a UK resident, was arrested by UK
authorities at the request of the U.S. Department of
Justice. 12 The Complaint, which will be discussed in
greater detail below, covers trading by the Defendants
in thee-mini S&P 500 stock index futures contract for
the period of April2010 through April6, 2015, during
which time the Defendants utilized a "Layering"
Algorithm on over 400 different trading days. 13 Accordingly, the CFTC is alleging fraudulent trading by
the Defendants covering both pre-and post-Dodd
Frank Act standards ofliability.
The CFTC asserts, in essence, that the Defendants
engaged in a massive effort to manipulate the CME's
e-mini S&P 500 futures contracts (hereinafter referred
to as "S&P e-minis") by "utilizing a variety of exceptionally, large aggressive, and persistent spoofing
tactics" and that Defendants "schemed to design an
automated system to manipulate the E-mini S&P price
to their benefit." 14 The Complaint further alleges that
"Defendants' actions caused artificial prices to exist in
the intra-day price of the lead month of the E-mini
S&P" on at least twelve trading days during the five
year period. 15 To achieve this manipulative trading
activity, the CFTC Complaint alleges that:
"Defendants utilized an automated 'layering' algoritlun
(the Layering Algoritlun) that typicaiiy simultaneously
layered four to six exceptionally large sell orders into
the visible E-mini S&P central limit order book (Order
Book). Each seii order was one price level from the
next, generaiiy beginning at least three or four price
levels from the best asking price in the Order Book. As
the market price moved, Defendants' Layering Algorithm automaticaiiy simultaneously moved the large
seii orders, resulting in the orders remaining at least
three or four price levels from the best asking price in
the Order Book. This caused the orders to remain visible to other market participants in the Order Book,

~

2015 Thomson Reuters

Futures and Derivatives Law Report
with very .little risk of the sell orders resulting in a
consummated trade because each order was several
price levels above the best asking price."16

The CFTC alleges that the Defendants "placed
hundreds of orders for tens of thousands of contracts
that were modified thousands of times and eventually
canceled over 99% without ever resulting in a
trade." 17 • Also, the CFTC alleges that the Defendants
" 'flashed' large lot orders in a variety oflot sizes in
the Order Book that were quickly canceled with no
intention of these orders resulting in trades (Flash
Spoofing)," although some orders were executed18 As
a result of these trading tactics, the CFTC Complaint
alleges that the Defendants "traded on average $7.8
billion in notional value, resulting in daily profits averaging approximately $530,000. Defendants profited
approximately $6.4 million on the twelve" days noted
above, and $40 million in tota1. 19
The most interesting of the various CFTC allegations is that Defendants used their trading strategies
on May 6, 2010, the so-called Flash Crash Day, to create artificial prices. In support of this allegation, the
CFTC alleges:
"Defendants first turned on the Layering Algorithm at
9:20am CT, placing four orders totaling 2,100
contracts. These orders were each one tick apart, starting three ticks away from the best ask. The orders were
modified 604 times over the following six minutes so
the orders were always at the third level of the sell-side
of the order book or deeper, and then canceled with no
executions, as the layering Algorithm was turned off.
.... While the first cycle of the Layering Algorithm
was active, Defendant bought 1,606 contracts and sold
1.032 contracts.
At 11: 17am CT, Defendants turned the Layering
Algorithm on for more than two consecutive hours,
until I :40pm CT. During this cycle, Defendants utilized
the Layering Algorithm to place five orders, totaling
3,000 contracts. A sixth order was added at around
1:13pm CT, increasing the total to 3,600 contracts.
Between 11:17am CT and 1:40pm CT, Defendants actions contributed to an extreme order book imbalance
in the E-mini S&P market. That order book imbalance

~·

2015 Thomson Reuters

June 2015 I Volume 35 I Issue 5
contributed to market conditions that caused the E-mini
S&P price to fall 361 basis points." 20

As a result of the Defendants' trading schemes, the
CFTC has alleged that the Defendants violated the
CEA as follows:
I. Count One: Sections 6(c) 21 and 9(a)(2) 22 of the

Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") for the period prior to August 15,2011 and CFTC Regulation 180.2 23 for the period after August 15,2011
for manipulating the E-mini S&P futures
contract.
2. Count Two: Sections 6(c)(3) 24 and 9(a)(2) 25 of
the CEA for the period prior to August 15, 2011
and Sections 6(c)(3), 9(a)(2) and 13(a)(2) 26 of
the CEA and CFTC Rule 180.2 for the period
after August 15,2011 for attempting to manipulate theE-mini S&P market.
3. Count Three: Section 4c(a)(5)(c)27 of the CEA
for spoofing of theE-Mini S&P futures contract
for the period of July 16, 2011 to the present.
4. Count Four; Sections 6(c)(l) 28 and 9(c)(l) 29 of
the CEA and CFTC Rule 180.1 30 for use of
manipulative devices in connection with trading
theE-mini S&P futures contract. 31
The CFTC Complaint seeks a host of remedies,
including civil penalties of the greater of $140,000 or
three times the monetary gain from each of the thousands of alleged violations of the CEA. 32

Allegations in the Criminal Complaint
The Department of Justice (DOJ) alleged most of
the same facts set forth in the CFTC Complaint
through an Affidavit of Gregory LaBerta, a Special
Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI"). 33 What is interesting is that the Laberta Affidavit refers to a "consulting group" that assisted the
DOJ in connection with its investigation and filing of
the criminal complaint but this firm is not identified in

15
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the Affidavit. The Affidavit stated that this Consulting
Group determined that:
1. Sarao "typically executed a series of trades to
exploit his own manipulative. activity by repeatedly selling futures contracts only to buy them
back at a slightly lower price."
2. The Consulting Group "examined over 400 days
on which Sarao traded E-Minis between April
2010 and April 2014 . . . and found that Sarao
used the dynamic layering technique on approximately 63 percent of those days."
3. Sarao also repeatedly used a different trading
technique"l88- and/or 289-lot orders on the sell
side of the market, nearly all of which he canceled before the orders were executed" to "intensify the manipulative effects of his dynamic
layering technique."
4. Sarao used a third trading technique whereby he
"flashed a large 2,000-lot order on one side of
the market, executed an order on the other side
of the market, and canceled the 2,000-lot order
before it was executed."34
LaBerta also stated that he spoke with another
expert, who was not identified, who reviewed the
analyses done by the Consulting Group and opined
that Sarao's "dynamic layering technique affected the
market price of the E-Minis during that time period,
creating artificial prices. 35
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U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)); and criminal spoofing (7 U.S.C.
§§ 6(a) and 13(a)(2)). 38 Those charges carry a maximum of 380 years in prison if Sarao is convicted on
all counts and given consecutive sentences. In the
meantime, Sarao was unable to raise money for bail
because his assets were frozen worldwide by U.S.
authorities. 39

Comparing the Old and the New
Theories
The CFTC's Complaint against Sarao contains
charges of: (1) actual and attempted price manipulation in violation of provisions of the CEA that existed
before it was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act in
2010; 40 (2) manipulation under amendments added by
Dodd-Frank; 41 and (3) "spoofing" violations under another provision added by Dodd-Frank. 42 The following is an analysis of the elements required to prove
each of those charges.

Old School Anti-Manipulation Authority
The original anti-manipulation prohibitions contained in the CEA, when it was enacted in 1936, were
at the very heart of the effort by Congress to regulate
the commodity futures markets. However, the CEA
failed to define what it meant by manipulation. It was,
therefore, left to the government and the courts to
define the term. 43 They came up with a four-part test
that requires the following elements to be proved in
order to establish an actual commodity price
manipulation:

The Criminal Complaint, like the CFTC Complaint,
alleges that Sarao's actions contributed to the Flash
Crash. 36 In particular, based on analyses done by the
Consulting Group and the other expert, it was asserted
that Sarao contributed to the order-book imbalance,
and was thus a cause of the Flash Crash. 37

1. The trader had the ability to influence market
prices;

The Criminal Complaint charges wire fraud (18
U.S. C. § 1343); criminal commodity fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1348); criminal manipulation under the CEA (7

4. the trader caused the artificial price. 44

2. The trader specifically intended to create an
artificial price;
3. An artificial price occurred; and

In an attempted manipulation case, the CFTC has
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asserted that it need only prove specific intent through
some overt act that was intended to be manipulative. 45
The elements of manipulation and attempted manipulation under this pre-Dodd Frank authority are
very difficult to prove. Indeed, while obtaining numerous settlements, the CFTC has won only one adjudicated manipulation case in its forty-year history. 46
The reasons for this difficulty are many. For example, prominent economists testifying as experts on
whether a price was artificial often disagree on that
issue. Regression analysis by those experts, such as
the one filed by the CFTC in support of the Sarao complaint, 47 are difficult for a fact finder to understand and
subject to attack by other experts. In proving that a
defendant caused an artificial price, opposing experts
may disagree over whether the price was actually
artificial. Expert economic analysis claiming that the
defendant caused an artificial price is often subject to
criticism for failing to account for every factor that
might have affected the price. 48

I

The intent requirement in the old CEA manipulation definition is even more problematic. The CFTC
has held that "the requisite level of mens rea required
to prove manipulation or attempted manipulation
under the Commodity Exchange Act is that of 'specific
intent,' or as that term is also commonly understood
to mean today, 'purposeful conduct.' "49
The CFTC Complaint alleges that the trading at issue was intended to move market prices so that Defendants could profit. However, the fact that a trader is
seeking to move prices in one direction or another is
not itself sufficient proof of manipulative intent. As
the district court held in CFTC v. Delay in a similar
context:
Simply stated, it is not a violation of the statute to report
feeder cattle sales to the USDA with the intention of
moving the CME index up or down-rather, to be
unlawful, the reported sales must be sham or nonexistent transactions, or the reports must be knowingly
false or misleading. In this case, it turns out that the
sales were real and the reports were true. 5°
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In this case, as described below, Sarao will undoubtedly argue that his trades were real ones because
he was at market risk.

New School Anti-Manipulation Authority
The CFTC's claims under the new Dodd-Frank
anti-manipulation authority also face some formidable obstacles. The language in that provision was borrowed from Section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 ("34 Act"), which prohibits any ""manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.'' 51
Under familiar canons of statutory construction, this
means that this new language in the CEA will be
interpreted in the same manner as it ha~ been under
the 34 Act. 5 2
The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfeldey53 that the use of the word "manipulative" in
Section 1O(b) of the 34 Act was "especially significant.
It is and was virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities markets. It connotes intentional
or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud
investors by controlling or artificially affecting the
price of securities.''54 Later, as it did in the Hochfelder
case, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe v. Green, 55
defined the term manipulation for purposes of Section
1O(b) to refer "generally to practices, such as wash
sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting
market activity."56 .
This same approach has been taken in criminal
cases charging Section 1O(b) violations. In United
States v. Mulheren, 57 the Second Circuit set aside the
conviction of the chief trader for a broker-dealer on
manipulation charges brought under Section I O(b ).
That trader, John Mulheren, had been told by Ivan
Boesky that a particular stock was a good buy and that
it "would be great" if it traded at $45, a price that
would benefit Boesky's holdings. Mulheren then
entered an order for the stock at that price. The Second
Circuit held that this conduct was too ambiguous to
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support a manipulation charge because there was no
evidence of trading practices commonly associated
with manipulation, e.g., wash trades.
The decision in the Mulheren case gave rise to a
debate over whether "open market" trades, i.e., bona
fide orders that are subject to market risk, cannot be
manipulative because they are real trades, as opposed
to wash trades, matched tra·des, or other rigged
trades. 58
Subsequently, in ATSI Communications Inc. v. The
Shaar Fund Ltd., 59 the defendants were charged with
engaging in a "death spiral" strategy in which they
sold short to drive down prices and then covered their
short position with securities bought at the lower
prices set by their own short sales. The Second Circuit
held that manipulation under Section 1O(b) requires a
showing that the defendant "engaged in market activity aimed at deceiving investors as to how other market participants have valued a security."60 The inquiry
that must be made is to determine "whether trading
activity sends a false pricing signal to the market." 61
In that regard, the Court gives some assistance to the
Sarao Defendants because it held that short selling in
large volume to the distress of other market participants is not in and of itself actionable. Rather, to be
manipulative, the short sales had to be willfully
combined with some other activity that created a false
impression of how market participants were valuing
the security. 62
Less helpful to the Sarao Defendants is a decision
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Markowski v. SEC, 63 where the open market trade
defense was rejected. There, the. defendants were supporting the price of a stock through real bids and
offers. The Court noted the debate over whether open
market trades could ever be manipulative, but concluded that the SEC's contra position was not unreasonable, at least under the circumstances of that case.
However, the Court noted that, in the absence of fictitious trades, it could be difficult to "separate a 'rna-
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nipulative' investor from one who is simply overenthusiastic, a true believer in the object of investment.
Both may amass huge inventories and place high bids,
even though there are scant objective data supporting
the implicit estimate of the stock's value." 64 In such
circumstances, legality would "depend entirely on
whether the investor's intent was 'an investment
purpose' or 'solely to affect the price of[the] security.'
65
"
Here, Sarno claims the former as his motive.
In any event, there are other defenses available to
Sarno. The 34 Act language was borrowed by DoddFrank in order to reduce the CFTC's burden to prove
manipulative intent. 66 However, it is not entirely clear
that the burden will be much different under the new
provision. The Supreme Court held in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder67 that scienter must be proven in order
to prove a claim brought under Section 1O(b ), i.e., that
the defendant acted with a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 68 This
sounds like a specific intent requirement.
The Supreme Court has not further defined the standard for scienter under Section 1O(b ), but the lower
courts have concluded that "reckless" conduct is sufficient to establish the requisite intent. However, that
is still a high standard of proof of intent. The Seventh
Circuit, which is the circuit where the Sarao cas~ is
lodged, has defined reckless conduct under Section
1O(b) as a "highly unreasonable [act or] omission,
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have
been aware of it." 69 This is a very high standard of
intent and the difference between that standard and the
specific intent required under the pre-Dodd-Frank
anti-manipulation authority is apparently slight. 70

The New Spoofing Authority
The spoofing prohibition cited in the CFTC Com-

g:

2015 Thomson Reuters

Futures and Derivatives Law Report
plaint against the Defendants was also added by DoddFrank. That provision prohibits any transaction that
"is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to
the trade as, "spoofing" (bidding or offering with the
intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution)."71
The CFTC contends that Defendants placed hun~
dreds of thousands of orders for the E-mini S&P
futures contract in the near-month with the "intent" of
cancelling those orders before execution.72 Again, this
raises the issue of the degree and nature of the required
intent because, as noted below, Saro contends that he
was engaged in a bona fide market strategy that
required frequent cancellations.
The CFTC issued an interpretive guidance and
policy statement after the anti-spoofing provision was
added to the CEA by Dodd-Frank in which it addressed the issue of intent in spoofing cases. 73 The
CFTC stated that a trader must be shown to:
"act with some degree of intent, or scienter, beyond
recklessness to engage in the 'spoofing' trading practices prohibited by CEA section 4c(a)(5)(C). Because
CEA section 4c(a)(5)(C) requires that a person intend
to cancel a bid or offer before execution, the Commission does not interpret reckless trading, practices, or
conduct as constituting a spoofing violation. Additionally, the Commission interprets that a spoofing violation will not occur when the person's intent when
cancelling a bid or offer before execution was to cancel
such bid or offer as part of a legitimate, good-faith attempt to consummate a trade." 74
This specific intent requirement will be difficult to
meet.
The CFTC interpretive statement also stated that
spoofing would occur where a party submitted or
canceled bids or offers with the intent to create artificial price movements upwards or downwards. 75 This
raises the issue of whether Defendants thought they
were responding to market changes or whether they
were seeking to create such price changes artificially.
This new spoofing authority has been attacked in
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another criminal case, United States v. Coscia, 76 as
being void for vagueness. Although the district court
rejected that claim in that case, it may have some
credence on appeaF 7 The word "spoofing" is certainly
a vague term. It appears to have originated as the name
of a card game invented by a comedian in the 1880s.
It was also later used as a term to describe a harmless
hoax or gentle mocking of another person. 78
Spoofing appears to have been applied in the first
instance in financial markets to a form of an Internet
scam. The spoofer in those cases sent out mass emails
with false originating addresses in an effort to manip~
ulate the price of a stock. For example, a blast email
would be sent out that falsely indicated that the officer
of a public company was publishing information that
would have market effect. The perpetrator would trade
in advance of the email and profit from the market
reaction. 79
The new use of the term spoofing, i.e., to prohibit
orders not intended to be filled, is a far different creature than that originally attacked in the email cases.
This suggests that the term can be given any meaning
desired by regulators and provides little guidance on
what is permitted and what is prohibited. In that
regard, the use of the term spoofing in the context of
cancelling orders conflicts with other permitted market practices.
Historically "flash" orders, i.e., orders that are
flashed and immediately canceled, have long been
considered to be permissible because they can attract
trading interest to a market. 80 "Pinging" is another
permissible practice that involves the entry of an order that is immediately cancelled. These orders are
used as a means to determine if there is a trader on the
sidelines seeking a better than existing market price.
The pinging order seeks to draw out that interest from
dark pools or other venues. This is considered a
permissible practice because the order may be executed before cancellation. This raises a vagueness issue because there is no clear line between pinging,
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flash trades and spoofing. 81 As noted in the New York
Times:
High-frequency traders often 'ping' different markets
by sending orders to gauge interest in a stock, and more
than 90 percent are estimated to be -canceled. That is
not spoofing because there is a chance the order will be
filled but illustrates the fine line between accepted practices and illegal conduct. 82

As the CFTC has also noted with respect to manipulation claims, "a clear line between lawful and unlawful activity is required in order to ensure that innocent
trading not be regarded with the advantage of hindsight as unlawful manipulation." 83 That bright line
may not exist in the Sarao case.

Prior Cases
There is not a lot of helpful precedent through
which to analyze the Sarao case under the old CEA
manipulation provisions. Manipulation cases brought
under that authority tend to be in one of three classes:
(1) market power in which the trader has control of
supply and a corresponding futures position; (2) false
reports of trading activity at artificial price levels; and
(3) rigged trades. The Sarao case does not fit well into
any of those categories.
Presumably, the CFTC will argue that the Defendants' trading was some form of rigged trade, which
was the basis for its only success in an adjudicated
manipulation proceeding. In that case, In the Matter
of Diplacido, 84 the Second Circuit in an unpublished
opinion, upheld a CFTC administrative decision,
which held that a trader engaged in manipulation by
"banging the close" with orders that violated the bids
and offers of other traders. There does not appear to
be any such conduct in this case.

An earlier decision by a hearing officer in the
Department of Agriculture, which predated the CFTC,
found manipulation where a trader bought up all the
orders posted on the close of trading in constant
ascending prices and then offered and bought at even
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higher prices. 85 This was found to be manipulation
but it too does not seem to fit this case.
The CFTC also settled a pre-Dodd-Frank manipulation case by consent in which it charged that the respondent traded on the CME with the intent to "push"
the prices of nonfat dry milk futures contracts higher. 86
The respondent was seeking to establish a large short
position in those same futures contracts with the hope
that the market would then sell off and allow a profit.
The CFTC charged that the trader attempted to manipulate futures prices higher by (I) executing trades
by 'lifting' offers, and then immediately bidding a
higher price than just paid in the trade; (2) placing
both bids and offers above prevailing market prices
across multiple contract months in order to establish
higher price ranges in the market; and (3) consistently
placing bids above the opening price or the prevailing
price across multiple contracts. This case was based
on the premise that traders normally buy low and sell
high, while here the trader was allegedly buying high
rather than low. This too does not seem to fit the Sarao
facts. In any event, that case was settled by consent
and therefore, may have little precedential effect.
With respect to the "layering" charges under the
new Dodd-Frank anti-manipulation authority, the SEC
and FINRA have brought actions making such claims
under the 34 Act. 87 In a case that was settled by
consent, the SEC defined layering/spoofing as follows:
"Layering concerns the use of non-bona fide orders, or
orders that the trader does not intend to have executed,
to induce others to buy or sell the security at a price not
representative of actual supply and demand. More
specifically, a trader places a buy (or sell) order that is
intended to be executed, and then immediately enters
numerous non-bona fide sell (or buy) orders for the
purpose of attracting interest to the bona fide order.
These non-bona fide orders are not intended to be
executed. The nature of these orders is to induce, or
trick, other market participants to execute against the
initial, bona fide order. Immediately after the execution
against the bona fide order, the trader cancels the open,
non-bona fide orders, and repeats this strategy on the
opposite side of the market to close out the position."88
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The CFTC brought an earlier layering/spoofing
case, which was similar to those brought by the SEC.
In In the Matter ofPanther Trading LLC, 89 the CFTC
charged that respondents placed small orders to sell
futures that wanted executed, followed quickly by severallarge buy orders at successively higher prices that
they intended to cancel before execution. The buy
orders were intended to give the impression that there
was significant buying interest that would lift prices.
This increased the likelihood that the respondents'
small sell order would be executed, raising the likelihood that other market participants would buy from
the small order. This process would then be reversed
with a small buy order and several sell orders that
would be canceled. These cancellations were done
very quickly, but the Defendants' order imbalance offers remained open for some time even as they were
being adjusted for all the market to see. In any event,
the Panther case was settled by consent and without
any admission of wrongdoing.
Also of interest is CME Rule 575, which prohibits
certain disruptive trading practices. Specifically, that
rule states that "[n]o person shall enter or cause to be
entered an order with the intent, at the time of order
entry, to cancel the order before execution or to
modify the order to avoid execution." The CFTC complaint states that Sarao is a member of the CME,90 but
that exchange has brought no action against him.
Moreover that rule is premised on business principles,
not on criminal or statutory manipulation. 91 In contrast, the government is seeking to crirninalize such
conduct through Sarao and other cases.

Does the Government Have a Case?
The facts in the Sarao case appear to be, in at least
some aspects, sui generis, which will require a review
of those unique facts to determine if the conduct in
question was manipulative or intended to be
disruptive. The filing of the complaint in CFTC's case
against Sarao was accompanied by a Declaration by a
CFTC investigator,92 the Declaration of Professor Ter-

June 2015 I Volume 35 I Issue 5
renee Hendershott, w professor at the University of
California at Berkeley Business School,93 and emails
from Sarao detailing his trading strategies and giving
instructions on how to modify his trading system to
accommodate his trading strategies. 94 This documentation allows an unusual opportunity for an analysis of
the strength of each party's case before trial.
Sarao will likely argue that his trades were bona
fide positions that put him at risk and that he did not
have any manipulative intent. Indeed, Sarao so stated
to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in London,
i.e., "[m]y orders are 100% at risk, 100% of the
time." 95 Also, according to the CFTC Complaint,
Sarao was a very successful trader who netted profits
totaling $40 million from his trading strategies. 96 If
so, this presumably reflects the fact that there was
considerable risk in his trading. This is because the
amount of risk in an investment or trade is usually
commensurate with the possible reward. The CFTC's
expert report also concedes that, albeit in small
amounts, some ofthe away-from-the-market orders
entered by Sarao were actually executed before they
could be canceled.97
Sarao also documented the reason for his practice
of entering and cancelling orders to keep them away
from the best bid or offer, which is the crux of the
government's case:
"The other orders I sometimes place during the day are
slightly away from the market price and move up and
down as the market moves with it. This is to catch any
blips up/down in the market so that I can make a small
profit as the market comes back into line (almost
immediately). These orders are placed rarely and only
when I believe the market is excessively weak or
strong. Again, this was inspired by other traders I could
see doing the exact same thing."98

This strategy might have had price effect, but all
volume traders will affect the market price. Moreover,
if taken at his word, Sarao seems to believe that market forces rather than his orders were causing the market correction. This could negate a claim of manipulative intent.
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Another wrinkle in this case is the fact that its filing
resulted in worldwide headlines because the government in April 2015 charged that Sarao's trading had
contributed to the Flash Crash that occurred on May
6, 2010. 99 However, if his trading actually had such a
massive destabilizing effect, why did it take the
government so long to figure out his role? Instead, the
government, after much investigation, initially concluded that its cause lay elsewhere. Further, as noted
by the New York Times, if Sarao's trading was so
destabilizing, and it is charged that he was trading
often, why did it not crash the market on other occasions?100

II

Another gap in this case is a failure by the government or its expert to explain why the market dropped
simply because Sarao's algorithm kept his order at a
given distance from the best bid or offer. The Complaint makes numerous references to the fact that these
orders created an imbalance on the sell side, but why
did the market react to an order that was keeping a
constant distance from better orders? Did the market
react the same way for every order imbalance created
in this manner? If not, why not? And why did not market participants just ignore the Defendants' orders,
which could readily be observed displayed on the order book at always a constant distance from the best
offer?
Another question lacking an answer is why did
high-frequency-traders (HFTs) not adjust their algorithms to profit from any market effect caused by
Sarao's orders? Sarao was a relatively unsophisticated, and very slow trader. In his words, he was "an
old school point and click prop trader" who used a
mouse for order entry and a limited algorithm to move
the order imbalance as the market changed. 101 As the
New York Times noted, HFTs in the market "could
reasonably be expected to adjust their algorithms to
recognize the type of orders he used and discount their
likely effect on prices." 102
Sarao also pointed out to the FCA that he was trad-
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ing on a very popular U.S. market from London
without a high speed trading line. 103 In contrast, his
competition, the HFTs, have co-located servers in
Chicago and have access to high-speed communication lines. 104 As Saro stated to the FCA, he was at a
disadvantage to the HFTs:
"Certainly not for a guy like me who is trading from
the UK and who's system is miles too slow compared
to these people due to ihe fact that my orders have to
travel further than everyone else's who are trading in
the USA. No wonder they can manipulative (sic) on
top of my orders without any risk, for even when I
change my mind and decide to sell into my buy order,
the manipulative orders disappear in the 4 milliseconds
it takes for my buy order to be canceled and replaced
with my sell order ·so that I do not trade with myself!!! !"105
Sarao further complained to the FCA that others
were manipulating the market through fake orders and
were taking advantage of his orders. Sarao asserts that
95 percent of HFT orders are not "genuine" or "possibly even tradable." 106 Saro seems to be claiming that
he is defending himself from the HFTs, as opposed to
manipulating the market. This seems to be confirmed
by a newspaper report that Sarao made over 100
complaints to the CME over the course of several
years about the trading activities of HFTs that he
claimed were manipulative. 107
Surely, the nimble HFT traders would have spotted
this order imbalance phenomenon allegedly created
by Sarao and took advantage of his relatively large
latency in order entry. Surely, large institutional traders in the market would have spotted this strategy if it
was really impacting the market and responded to rob
Sarao of this opportunity. How then could Sarao
defeat the HFTs except, as he claims, his "intuition"
was the reason for his trading success?
In seems from Sarao' s view that he discovered a
market flaw, developed a trading strategy that allowed
him to avoid the predations of the HFTs and which
was successful. Sarao, it appears, does not understand
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why is he prohibited from using a successful trading
strategy, especially since he views the HFTs as the
real villains in the market. Further, Sarao actually executed trades and made money. So, he must be providing liquidity to someone? In all events, it is difficult to
understand how the Defendants' trading was a cause
ofthe Flash Crash. 108

Conclusion
The case against Sarao raises many interesting issues, but it is an ad hoc approach to regulation that
provides little guidance for traders. What is needed
are exchange controls that limit cancellations of orders
that .c<:mtinually create an order imbalance at a given
distance from the market. In that case, there would be
no need for doubtful criminal and civil charges against
traders seeking to take advantage of market flaws, as
traders have done since time immemorial.
(c) FiUer and Markham
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FROM THE EDITOR
Congratulations Derivatives Law
Graduates 2015
It is June, the month for graduations, parties and
proms. Derivatives University Law School (DULS)
had its commencement last week. The graduation
speaker was Dr. Karla Marks, the Chairwoman of the
new Bitcoin Swap Execution Facility (Bitcoin SEF).
Dr. Marks congratulated the students on completing
three years of grueling study. In her commencement
speech, Dr. Marks told the DULS graduates they must
never stop learning, they must always keep up with
regulatory developments, and they should never stop
asking the CFTC the hard questions. She told the
students that with all the problems facing our country-threats in the Middle East, terrorism, economic
stagnation, poverty, financial system instability, policing incidents, climate change - they should reflect on
the following 8 crucial questions.
1. Were Bitcoins "commodities" before and/or after the CFTC approved of their being traded on
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collection practices and the CFTC's proposed
exemption for commodity trading advisors'
recordkeeping obligations for text messages and
recorded phone calls?
4. What is the basis for the CFTC's jurisdiction
over aluminum warehouses located in the United
States that are owned by the London Metals
Exchange, which is regulated by the United
Kingdom's Financial Conduct Authority?
5. What would the CFTC's position be if Delaware
commodity pools offered only to United States
investors that have sleeves managed by European trading managers were characterized as
"EMIR Persons" for EU regulatory compliance
purposes?
6. Do trade options that have been transacted for
centuries by commercial entities pose such a
threat to the U.S. financial system that they need
to be regulated by the CFTC?
7. Has the CFTC created legal certainty as to their
regulatory status as. swaps for commercial deliverable physical commodity forward contracts
that have embedded volumetric optionality?
8. Is the LIBOR rate a "commodity" regulated by
the CFTC and, if your answer is yes, why?

the Bitcoin SEF?
2. Will requiring margin to be posted by commercial end-users for uncleared swap threaten
the creation of jobs, or will it create more and
innovative back-office jobs for margin professionals?
3. What is the correlation between the Second
Circuit's May 7, 2015 decision invalidating the
National Security Agency's telephone metadata
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Dr. Marks went on to warn the DULS graduates to
use sun screen, drink plenty of water, act ethically and
read every law firm's client alerts on the CFTC's
swaps rules that you can find on Google. Her parting
words were: "May the retail forex be with you."
MSS
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